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 2 
The UNESCO World Heritage List has been continuously growing since the first sites 3 
were listed in 1978. It has frequently been highlighted as a marker of quality and 4 
authenticity, and UNESCO underscores that designation is important for tourist 5 
visitation. Given the vastness of the List, and its expected continued growth, it 6 
becomes relevant to understand the mechanism by which UNESCO and the States 7 
Parties work to promote the dissemination and use of the World Heritage brand. This 8 
paper proposes that the relationship between these entities is best expressed through a 9 
franchise model wherein UNESCO is the franchisor and the States Parties franchisees. 10 
Therefore, through an analysis of UNESCO World Heritage policy and practice 11 
documents combined with general franchising theory, this work seeks to emphasize 12 
the appropriateness of this business model in understanding the management practices 13 
of both UNESCO and the States Parties. 14 
 15 
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1 INTRODUCTION 18 
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) World 19 
Heritage (WH) site status has often been lauded as a symbol of quality, with Ryan and 20 
Silvanto (2011, p. 306) calling it a “coveted brand and seal of approval.” Therefore, it is 21 
unsurprising that there has been a consistent increase in submissions for inscription, with 22 
1640 sites in 175 States Parties
1
 currently on the tentative list. This is in addition to the 1052 23 
sites that have already been listed. Given the vastness of the WH List, and its expected 24 
continued growth, it becomes important to understand the mechanism by which the UNESCO 25 
WH Committee and the States Parties work to promote the dissemination and use of the WH 26 
brand. Therefore, this paper proposes that the relationship between these entities can be 27 
conceptualized as a franchise model wherein UNESCO is the franchisor and the States 28 
Parties franchisees. The concepts of franchising and UNESCO WH are rarely, if ever, 29 
discussed simultaneously. In fact, the idea that UNESCO works as a franchisor has only been 30 
mentioned twice. Probst (2007) presented the concept in relation to a cultural event which 31 
was part of a UNESCO initiative to fundraise for art-based strategies in Africa. This idea was 32 
in part derived from an opinion piece by Wolfgang Kemp (2005) wherein he notes that 33 
UNESCO licenses out its name. However, neither of these authors expanded on their ideas. 34 
Therefore, this work seeks to emphasize the appropriateness of this business model in 35 
understanding the management relationship that exists between UNESCO and the States 36 
Parties.  37 
2 THE FRANCHISE FORMAT 38 
                                                          
1
 There are currently 193 States Parties that have ratified the WH convention. Of these, 189 are full members of 
the UN, with only Liechtenstein, Nauru, Somalia, and Tuvalu not being signatories. The other 4 States Parties 
are comprised of 2 permanent observers to the UN (the Holy See and Palestine) and 2 non-member states (the 
Cook Islands and Niue). 
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A franchise can be identified as a business relationship, supported by a contract, wherein one 39 
organization, a franchisee, purchases, through initial fees and, later, royalties, the rights to the 40 
brand and business model of another organization, the franchisor (Combs et al., 2004; Blair 41 
& Lafontaine, 2005; Badrinarayanan et al., 2016). These relationships are mutually beneficial 42 
for both parties and can be especially valuable when expansion is sought in international 43 
markets (Eroglu, 1992; Quinn, 1999). As stated, the basis of the franchise relationship is a 44 
contract that outlines the expectations for both actors as well as creating the power dynamic 45 
which will be in place during the duration of the arrangement (Rubin, 1978). This includes 46 
the give and take visible in terms of ownership and product quality control (Brickley & Dark, 47 
1987). Selection of appropriate franchisees, therefore, is of paramount importance. Brookes 48 
and Altinay (2011, p. 345) recommend “having a set of selection criteria and selection 49 
process in place” in order to assure that the appropriate franchisees are chosen. According to 50 
the empirical results found in Jambulingam and Nevin (1999, p. 389), these criteria should 51 
include “high [levels of] perceived innovativeness, and a high personal commitment to the 52 
business” in concert with more specific criteria derived from current successful franchise 53 
partnerships. In relation to their study of franchises in the tourism industry, Altinay et al. 54 
(2013, p.184) emphasize the importance of both franchisors and franchisees being well 55 
informed of “the feasibility of the franchise concept in their locations.” These specific aspects 56 
will heighten the probability of a successful partnership for both parties. 57 
 Once the partners are selected and the contract is signed, there are certain 58 
requirements which both parties must fulfil. One of the most important of these, for the 59 
franchisor, is the expected inflow of cash. Franchisees make two separate payments 60 
throughout the contract period, an initial start-up fee and recurring royalties paid ad 61 
continuum (Shane, 1996; Blair & Lafontaine, 2005). In terms of the initial franchise fee, 62 
Shane (1996, p. 77) highlighted that, based on his data, this “fee averages one-half of the total 63 
franchisor-specific investment.” However, Lafontaine and Shaw (1999, p. 1044) indicate that 64 
the introductory payment amounts to only about eight per cent of a franchisee’s total financial 65 
contribution. Therefore, royalties from usage of the franchisor’s trademark or brand name are 66 
much more significant for the franchisor, often being a portion of total sales (Rubin, 1978). 67 
This system limits the franchisor’s risk as “the proportional variability of franchisee sales is 68 
smaller than the variability of profits” (Caves & Murphy, 1976, p. 579). Tikoo et al. (1999) 69 
advance this idea further by recommending that the rate be variable in order to not result in a 70 
stagnation of eventual sales. It is these two economic aspects which can often be most 71 
appealing to a franchisor. 72 
For the franchisees, the brand, or trademark, of the franchisor is often considered the 73 
most important aspect of the partnership (Hunt, 1977; Nyadzayo et al., 2011). However, as 74 
Nyadzayo et al. (2011, p. 1108) note, “too often franchisees complacently expect the brand to 75 
sell itself based on the assumption that it is well-established.” This can, in part, be remedied 76 
through the use of contractual requirements surrounding advertising fees, which are used to 77 
promote the brand at the national, regional, and local levels (Blair & Lafontaine, 2005). It has 78 
also been noted that franchisors can assist in the construction of good brand citizenship from 79 
franchisees, specifically in terms of promotion, in order to enhance the overall brand equity 80 
(Nyadzayo et al., 2011). This can be achieved by “encourag[ing] existing franchisees to 81 
embrace the culture of self-driven positive brand-related attitudes” (Nyadzayo, 2015, p. 82 
1893). Research by Badrinarayanan et al. (2016) indicates that brand resonance can be a 83 
particularly useful tool for franchisors in order to promote voluntary brand enrichment. 84 
Increased brand recognition is of particular importance when franchise companies choose to 85 
expand into international markets. For example, Lin et al. (2014) found that recognizable 86 
franchises were more likely to be used by foreign tourists who were visiting an area for the 87 
first time. However, in order for there to be a successful foreign expansion, the franchise 88 
system must promote the quality associated with the brand being purchased by the 89 
franchisees. 90 
The franchise business type can be “characterised by a high degree of standardisation” 91 
(Quinn, 1999, p. 346) which functions as a benchmark of the franchise, a quality indicator. 92 
Rubin (1978) observed that quality must be maintained across all franchised units in order to 93 
preserve the brand’s standing among its customers. Therefore, franchise contracts frequently 94 
require adherence to meticulously outlined quality standards, which are “especially important 95 
in businesses in which individual units cater to non-repeat customers” (Brickley & Dark, 96 
1987, p. 403). According to Brickley et al. (1991), sub-par quality levels at one franchised 97 
unit can have negative impacts on other franchisees in terms of a loss of customer volume as 98 
well as on the franchisor’s trademark itself. Furthermore, in business format franchising it 99 
becomes critical to ensure uniform, high levels of service quality as fluctuations result in 100 
increased levels of customer dissatisfaction (Jeon et al., 2014).  Thus, it can be seen that 101 
consumers expect a certain level of quality when dealing with a franchised brand, and a 102 
deviation from this quality level can significantly impact their perceptions of the brand. 103 
As quality and brand maintenance are important franchisee responsibilities, it is 104 
unsurprising that problems could arise when they are not maintained, which can result in 105 
termination of the franchise contract. As Blair and Lafontaine (2005) observed, termination is 106 
not immediate, as most franchisors will spend a period of time attempting to convince the 107 
franchisee in breach of contract to alter their behavior. However, failure to comply often 108 
results in the commencement of termination procedures. It is important to note that while 109 
breach of contract allows for termination of the franchise agreement, it is up to the discretion 110 
of the franchisor, which is especially problematic as “termination could impose a substantial 111 
financial burden on the franchisee” (Makar, 1988, p. 760). Additionally, due to certain legal 112 
“good cause” requirements in several countries, notably in several states in the USA, contract 113 
termination can be particularly expensive for the franchisor in terms of both legal fees and, 114 
potentially, court-awarded damages to the franchisee if “good cause” is not found (Brickley 115 
et al., 1991). This can often be proven by “comparing the performance of the terminated 116 
franchisee with that of other, similarly situated franchisees” (Emerson, 1998, p. 596). Thus, 117 
termination is often a final resort of the franchisor as it is costly for all involved and must be 118 
well supported from a legal standpoint. 119 
3 THE WORLD HERITAGE FRANCHISE SYSTEM 120 
While the above discussion focuses exclusively on the franchise model from a purely 121 
business perspective, the following sections will address the application of these structures 122 
and processes to the existing WH operational framework. This is particularly important as 123 
several authors (Logan, 2012; Meskell, 2015; Meskell et al., 2015) note the increasing focus 124 
of the States Parties on the perceived potential economic benefits of listing. In fact, Logan 125 
(2012, p. 120), in his analysis of WH Committee sessions, stated that “World Heritage [is] 126 
seen by many as a brand and inscription little more than a branding exercise.” Meskell (2015, 127 
p. 4) emphasizes the word “properties” in her discussion of WH, referring to them as 128 
“commodities that mobilise national and international flows.” Therefore, although the WH 129 
Convention arose from a desire to conserve and preserve natural and cultural heritage of 130 
global importance, the modern usage of listing by many States Parties has appeared to shift 131 
away from this focus towards one motivated by politics and economics. 132 
In the following section, the franchise model, as outlined in the literature, has been applied to 133 
existing UNESCO WH policy and practice. This data was derived from an analysis of 134 
relevant documents which are readily available from UNESCO. More specifically, the 135 
following analysis will be broken into segments concentrating on the identified distinctive 136 
features of franchise relationships: selecting partners and the contract structure, contract fees 137 
and royalties, advertising and trademark regulations, quality control measures, and eventual 138 
contract termination.  139 
3.1 SIGNING THE CONTRACT 140 
The WH Convention was adopted on November 16, 1972. This international treaty laid the 141 
groundwork for the protective soft legislation surrounding WH sites and their management 142 
and established the WH Committee, which is the group that organizes the WH List. However, 143 
UNESCO is not actually responsible for the selection of the nominated sites.  Instead, it is the 144 
responsibility of the respective States Parties to nominate those sites that they feel best 145 
represent the ideal of world heritage by illustrating each site’s Outstanding Universal Value. 146 
This is defined as “cultural and/or natural significance which is so exceptional as to transcend 147 
national boundaries and to be of common importance for present and future generations of all 148 
humanity” (UNESCO, 2015, p. 11).  In order to be considered for listing, sites must first go 149 
through a bidding process, wherein a State Party submits a nomination form demonstrating 150 
that they meet the WH criteria set by the UNESCO WH Centre. According to VanBlarcom 151 
and Kayahan (2011, p. 146), “the bidding process entails the preparation of a management 152 
plan, conducting supportive studies and consultation provided by third parties.” These criteria 153 
and requirements are specific in nature in order to ensure that the selected sites best represent 154 
the idea of Outstanding Universal Value. This mirrors the process involved in the pre-155 
contract interaction between a franchisor and franchisee, as can be seen in the framework in 156 
Figure 1.  157 
 158 
Figure 1 UNESCO Franchise Framework 159 
Furthermore, similarly to a franchise contract, the WH Convention (1972, p. 3) clearly 160 
outlines the balance of power by noting in Article 4 that “each State Party to this Convention 161 
recognizes that the duty of ensuring the identification, protection, conservation, presentation 162 
and transmission to future generations of the cultural and natural heritage.” Additionally, 163 
according to Goodwin (2010),  164 
after the nomination process is initiated…the treaty introduces a mechanism that 165 
emphasises the executive authority of the Committee over the World Heritage List. 166 
The Committee has control over: (1) initial admittance to the inventory; (2) officially 167 
declaring that an area of world heritage is danger; and (3) the deletion of a site from 168 
the World Heritage List (p. 288).  169 
Therefore, the power dynamics are clearly defined, with the WH Committee holding 170 
administrative power over the States Parties while the States Parties are responsible for 171 
upholding the priorities of the convention. This can be seen as an obligation to maintain the 172 
trademark and quality levels expected of a site of Outstanding Universal Value, which will be 173 
discussed further in this work. 174 
3.2 CONTRACTUAL FEES AND ROYALTIES 175 
While UNESCO does not directly require fees in order to be a member or to sign the WH 176 
Convention, there are several payment systems in place. When initially joining UNESCO, 177 
Article 5.9 of the Basic Text (2012) states that  178 
new Members shall be required to make a contribution for the financial period in 179 
which they become Members and provide their proportion of the total advances to the 180 
Working Capital Fund at rates to be determined by the General Conference. Such 181 
contributions shall be recorded as revenue in the year in which they are due. 182 
While this fee is not directly related to being a signatory of the WH Convention, it is a 183 
compulsory payment for a State Party wishing to become a member of UNESCO, which can 184 
be understood as a parent company of the WH organization. Furthermore, there are 185 
compulsory contributions required by all signatories to the WH Convention which should be 186 
paid biannually and not exceed one per cent of the total amount they are expected to 187 
contribute to UNESCO as a whole (UNESCO, 1972). As the normal budget of UNESCO 188 
only requires fees that would match the estimated amount of money which the organization 189 
will be required to spend on activities within a given States Party (UNESCO, 2012), the WH 190 
compulsory contributions would be feasible independent of the economic level of a country. 191 
Furthermore, although States Parties can opt out of this specific stipulation regarding 192 
compulsory fees, there is a strong recommendation that they should voluntary contribute an 193 
amount which is at least equivalent to what their compulsory contribution would have been. 194 
It should be noted that the Holy See, which has a quasi-state status in terms of international 195 
recognition, is a WH Convention signatory but not a member of UNESCO, and, thus, though 196 
they still pay voluntary contributions to the WH fund, they do not have required new member 197 
contributions. However, all other States Parties do have initial and continuing financial 198 
obligations to the franchisor, UNESCO. 199 
In addition to these compulsory and voluntary contributions, there are also certain 200 
fees associated with the use of the official WH emblem when financial gain is anticipated.  It 201 
is clearly stated in the Operational Guidelines (2015) that potential usage of the emblem 202 
needs to uphold the values of WH and not focus on the anticipated economic benefits, but 203 
this does not preclude its eventual use for commercial materials. This triggers a specific 204 
clause in the Operational Guidelines which states: 205 
When commercial benefits are anticipated, the Secretariat should ensure that the 206 
World Heritage Fund receives a fair share of the revenues and conclude a contract or 207 
other agreement that documents the nature of the understandings that govern the 208 
project and the arrangements for provision of income to the Fund…National 209 
authorities are also called upon to ensure that their properties or the World Heritage 210 
Fund receive a fair share of the revenues and to document the nature of the 211 
understandings that govern the project and the distribution of any proceeds (2015, 212 
p.60). 213 
These policies are consistent with the system of royalties found in general franchise systems, 214 
specifically as described in Rubin’s (1978) work, wherein a royalty payment is often a 215 
percentage of total sales.   216 
3.3 ADVERTISING AND TRADEMARK  217 
One of the greatest benefits of being a member of a franchise network is the usage of an 218 
established brand, which Nyadzayo et al. (2011, p. 1107) refer to as the “focal asset 219 
franchisees are buying from franchisors.” As sites are required to be of Outstanding Universal 220 
Value, as discussed in Section 3.1, this can be understood as one of the defining 221 
characteristics of the WH brand, emphasizing its distinction above national or local level 222 
heritage listings (World Heritage Centre, 2008). According to the WH Information Kit 223 
(World Heritage Centre, 2008), this eminence can be translated into external monetary 224 
support for the protection and management of the site as well as potential revenue from 225 
increased tourist visitation post-listing. The importance of the brand is further supported by 226 
the regulations for the plaques that are recommended by the most recent Operational 227 
Guidelines.  228 
These plaques are designed to inform the public of the country concerned and foreign 229 
visitors that the property visited has a particular value which has been recognized by 230 
the international community. In other words, the property is exceptional, of interest 231 
not only to one nation, but also to the whole world (UNESCO, 2015, p. 58). 232 
This again stresses the value of the WH brand to the international community as a signifier of 233 
global prestige.  234 
The UNESCO WH brand’s perceived distinction is also evident in the literature 235 
related to tourist visitation to WH sites. For example, Rakic and Chambers (2007, p. 146) 236 
refer to the WH List as “an accreditation scheme for heritage tourism attractions.” Frey and 237 
Steiner (2011, p. 563), in a discussion of the advertising potential of listing, took this concept 238 
even further by noting that that “a site not in the UNESCO List is, by definition, not quite 239 
first, but rather second rate…The tourist industry understands well that not being on the List 240 
is a considerable disadvantage for its advertising.” Ryan and Silvanto (2011, p. 306), as 241 
previously mentioned, refer to the WH brand as a “seal of approval” that operates as a 242 
guarantor of authenticity. King and Halpenny (2014, p. 1) take it one step further by stating 243 
that the “brand signals to the public a property so irreplaceable to humankind that its values 244 
must be sustained intact in perpetuity for the benefit of future generations.” Therefore, the 245 
WH status can be understood as the established brand being purchased by the States Parties 246 
from UNESCO, which has international recognizability.  247 
While standard forms of franchises generally require a certain percentage of the 248 
franchisee’s profits in order to support advertising efforts, UNESCO uses a slightly diverse 249 
model. After a site is listed, States Parties are responsible for making sure the site is 250 
sufficiently marked as an official WH site, though “at the country’s cost and with no 251 
assurance that visitors will recognize its meaning” (Di Giovine, 2009, p. 215). The UNESCO 252 
Operational Guidelines (2015) highlight the importance of placing the WH emblem in plain 253 
sight of visitors to the site, and, ideally, this would include a plaque, as previously mentioned, 254 
which has a standardized format.  In addition to the utilization of the plaque as a prestige 255 
marker, they “have an additional function which is to inform the general public about the 256 
World Heritage Convention or at least about the World Heritage concept and the World 257 
Heritage List” (UNESCO, 2015, p. 58). States Parties are also encouraged “to make broad 258 
use of the Emblem such as on [the WH sites’] letterheads, brochures and staff uniforms” 259 
(UNESCO, 2015, p. 59), which assists in the enhancement of WH brand equity by providing 260 
greater visibility to WH visitors. Therefore, while States Parties are not expected to pay 261 
UNESCO for advertising as in a traditional franchise system, they are expected to pay for 262 
their own usage of the WH emblem, the most conspicuous marker of listing, and provide 263 
visibility for the overall WH brand.  264 
3.4 QUALITY CONTROL 265 
The control of the brand and advertising responsibilities discussed in section 3.3 are 266 
particularly important for the States Parties as tourism is “vulnerable to extreme variability” 267 
which is alleviated in part by recognizable brands that function as a standardized quality 268 
indicator (Clarke, 2000, p. 331). More specifically in relation to WH, “status has become a 269 
measure of quality assurance, a trademark and an ‘authenticity stamp’ for the heritage tourist 270 
and an arena for the presentation of prestigious national heritage, integral to the national 271 
building projects of States Parties” (Rakic & Chambers, 2007, p. 146). WH serves as a 272 
substitute for missing knowledge by attesting that the WH site is the “real thing.” The WH 273 
site “guarantee,” as it is often regarded, spares the tourist or tour organizer the challenging 274 
task of judging and selecting potential sites on the basis of their intrinsic cultural merits and 275 
historic meanings. In sum, in the realm of heritage tourism, the WH brand is of critical 276 
importance because it testifies to historic attributes and developments that tourists, in many 277 
cases, would be unable to discern for themselves (Ryan and Silvanto, 2011).  278 
In order to ensure the necessary quality level needed for brand association, all potential 279 
sites are required to satisfy three conditions, which are separate from the categorization of 280 
their Outstanding Universal Value. Integrity, the first of these three, is defined in the 281 
UNESCO Operational Guidelines (2015), as   282 
a measure of wholeness and intactness of the natural and/or cultural heritage and its 283 
attributes. Examining the conditions of integrity, therefore requires assessing the extent to 284 
which the property:  285 
a. Includes all elements necessary to express its Outstanding Universal Value;  286 
b. Is of adequate size to ensure the complete representation of the features and 287 
processes which convey the property’s significance;  288 
c. Suffers from adverse effects of development and/or neglect (p. 18).   289 
The second deals with the necessity for effective protection of the listed site. Adequate site 290 
management is the final condition for listing, specifically in the form of a comprehensive site 291 
management plan. Furthermore, sites that are nominated under Criteria I-VI are required to 292 
meet an additional requirement related to authenticity.   293 
Properties may be understood to meet the conditions of authenticity if their cultural 294 
values (as recognized in the nomination criteria proposed) are truthfully and credibly 295 
expressed through a variety of attributes including:  296 
 Form and design;  297 
 Materials and substance;  298 
 Use and function;  299 
 Traditions, techniques and management systems;  300 
 Location and setting;  301 
 Language, and other forms of intangible heritage;  302 
 Spirit and feeling; and  303 
 Other internal and external factors (UNESCO, 2015, p. 17).   304 
Only after national assessment and justification using these criteria can a site be nominated 305 
for World Heritage listing. As WH sites function as singularities and, in fact, are listed based 306 
on their “outstanding” uniqueness, these listing qualities provide a level of standardization in 307 
terms of experience and quality levels, similar to business format franchise systems.  308 
In addition to the continued maintenance and protection measures, each site is subject to 309 
periodic reporting, which is undertaken for the following reasons:  310 
a. To provide an assessment of the application of the World Heritage Convention by the 311 
State Party;  312 
b. To provide an assessment as to whether the Outstanding Universal Value of the 313 
properties inscribed on the World Heritage List is being maintained over time;  314 
c. To provide up-dated information about the World Heritage properties to record the 315 
changing circumstances and state of conservation of the properties;  316 
d. To provide a mechanism for regional cooperation and exchange of information and 317 
experiences between States Parties concerning the implementation of 318 
the Convention and World Heritage conservation (UNESCO, 2015, p. 44).  319 
As can be noted, this periodic reporting assists in the preservation, protection, and 320 
management of the WH sites while also allowing for the eventual possibility of UNESCO 321 
involvement when necessary.  The reporting can also alert UNESCO to any possible danger 322 
faced by the site or damages already incurred which can result in placement either on the List 323 
of WH in Danger or eventual de-listing, which will be discussed in more depth in section 324 
3.5.  Thus, periodic reporting functions as a quality management method in order to assure 325 
the continued high quality levels that are expected of the UNESCO WH franchise brand. 326 
3.5 BREACH OF CONTRACT & TERMINATION 327 
Similarly to traditional business franchisees, States Parties are capable of being in breach of 328 
their contract, specifically in terms of financial obligations, trademark management, and 329 
maintenance of the expected quality levels as outlined in sections 3.2, 3.3, and 3.4 330 
respectively. As mentioned in section 3.4, States Parties are required to undertake periodic 331 
reporting, though this only occurs once every six years. However, at any point reactive 332 
monitoring can occur, either in response to a report of deterioration of the site, which is 333 
thoroughly investigated, failure to undertake already noted alterations to protect or restore the 334 
site, or a State Party’s notification of either “exceptional circumstances or work [that] is 335 
undertaken which may have an impact on the Outstanding Universal Value of the property or 336 
its state of conservation” (UNESCO, 2015, p. 37). However, the goal of this monitoring is to 337 
not only prevent deletion but also to remedy the situation if at all possible, similarly to the 338 
process that occurs in traditional franchise relationships when there has been a breach of 339 
contract.  340 
Upon receiving notification of the potential problems at a WH site, the situation is 341 
assessed by the UNESCO Advisory Bodies: the International Council on Monuments and 342 
Sites (ICOMOS), the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN), and the 343 
International Centre for the Study of the Preservation and Restoration of Cultural Property 344 
(ICCROM). As outlined in the UNESCO operational guidelines (2015, p. 39), these groups 345 
will verify the state of the site, and, dependent on its physical condition, there can either be 346 
no action, prescriptions for improvement, movement to the List of WH in Danger, or, 347 
potentially, complete deletion from the list. According to the Operational Guidelines (2015) 348 
current WH properties can only be inscribed on the List of WH in Danger if: 349 
b) the property is threatened by serious and specific danger;  350 
c) major operations are necessary for the conservation of the property; 351 
d) assistance under the Convention has been requested for the property (p. 40).   352 
Prior to being moved to the List of WH in Danger, UNESCO communicates with the State 353 
Party (or States Parties in the case of transboundary sites) responsible for the care and 354 
management of the site, and the two detail the required actions to remedy, as much as 355 
possible, whatever problem has been the catalyst for the movement of the site to the List. In 356 
order to support these actions, “a specific, significant portion of the World Heritage Fund” 357 
will be allotted to support the conservation efforts of these WH in Danger sites (UNESCO, 358 
2015, p. 43).  359 
Currently, there are 55 sites on the List of WH in Danger, of which 37 are cultural and 360 
18 natural, and these are located within the boundaries of 34 States Parties, with 1 361 
transboundary site. These sites will be reviewed every year in order to ascertain their current 362 
state of conservation as well as to plan for the future of each in regards to their WH status. 363 
Based on this information, the WH Committee, together with the relevant States Parties, can 364 
come to one of three decisions. They are as follows: 365 
a) Additional measures are required to conserve the property; 366 
b) to delete the property from the List of World Heritage in Danger if the 367 
property is no longer under threat;  368 
c) to consider the deletion of the property from both the List of World Heritage 369 
in Danger and the World Heritage List if the property has deteriorated to the 370 
extent that it has lost those characteristics which determined its inscription on 371 
the World Heritage List (UNESCO, 2015, p. 43). 372 
Deletion is the ultimate decision that the WH Committee will make, and it is not done lightly. 373 
In fact, only two sites (the Arabian Oryx Sanctuary, Oman in 2007 and the Dresden Elbe 374 
Valley, Germany in 2009) have been deleted since the inception of the WH List. 375 
 Deletion should be seen as a breach of the UNESCO franchise contract, most notably 376 
as Article 4 of the WH Convention (1972, p. 3) commits each signatory State Party to 377 
“[ensure] the identification, protection, conservation, presentation and transmission to future 378 
generations of the cultural and natural heritage…situated on its territory.” However, deletion 379 
from the WH List will only occur if either serious deterioration has occurred, destroying the 380 
site’s Outstanding Universal Value, or “where the intrinsic qualities of a World Heritage site 381 
were already threatened at the time of its nomination by human action and where the 382 
necessary corrective measures as outlined by the State Party at the time, have not been taken 383 
within the time proposed” (UNESCO, 2015, p. 43). Nonetheless, prior to de-listing, the WH 384 
Committee will confer with the State Party responsible for the site in order to attempt to 385 
remedy the situation. This is in part because  386 
deletion of a site…raises the spectre of immediate disadvantages, such as a loss of 387 
national esteem from public exposure of poor conduct, loss of visitor income to that 388 
site, and the weakening of political influence within national government 389 
structures…[T]he harmful consequences of deletion may also be more long term, 390 
impacting upon the future interests of the state party under the [WH Convention] 391 
(Goodwin, 2010, p. 308). 392 
As with business franchise systems, the franchisor, UNESCO, is aware of the negative 393 
ramifications of “terminating” the franchisee’s, the State Party’s, contract and only 394 
commences with deletion if there is valid “good cause” and after significant intervention 395 
attempts. 396 
4 CONCLUSIONS 397 
This work has illustrated, through a presentation of the existing franchise literature and an 398 
analysis of UNESCO policy and practice, the relevance of the franchise model in relation to 399 
the implementation of the WH convention. As can be seen, signing the WH convention and 400 
nominating sites is similar to a franchise contract negotiation process. As a result of this 401 
process, the States Parties must ensure to abide by certain contractually binding regulations. 402 
For example, States Parties are required to pay compulsory contributions as well as royalty 403 
fees when a profit is expected from use of the WH emblem, which is similar to the income 404 
structure of a franchise system. Furthermore, States Parties are strongly encouraged to 405 
promote the WH brand while also maintaining the high quality level that this brand represents 406 
at each individual site, or franchise location. When these obligations are not fulfilled, the 407 
relevant sites can be deemed “in danger,” which triggers assistance from UNESCO in order 408 
to remedy the problem(s). If the interventions are unsuccessful and/or ignored, then the 409 
relevant States Parties will be found in breach of contract which can trigger the deletion of 410 
the deteriorated site from the WH List.  411 
 However, this is not to say that there are not some complications when applying the 412 
franchise model to the WH system. Whereas traditional franchise systems are profit driven, 413 
UNESCO’s stated purpose is to protect the world’s heritage. However, as previously noted, 414 
often the rationale for the nominations is, in part, motivated by the prospect of economic gain 415 
through tourism receipts. While this does not correspond with their core goals, UNESCO 416 
does emphasize the importance of WH designation to tourism visitation as seen in the World 417 
Heritage Information Kit (2008), and this creates an important economic dynamic within the 418 
management relationship. Additionally, unlike a traditional franchise, there is no centralized 419 
advertising plan, with the onus of advertisement of the site lying with the individual States 420 
Parties. Furthermore, whereas there are clearly defined laws that dictate how franchise 421 
relationships function and protect both franchisor and franchisee, the WH convention 422 
operates as an international treaty, which operates as soft law. Nonetheless, the relationship 423 
between UNESCO and the States Parties shares the same distinct management characteristics 424 
that are found in traditional franchise systems. 425 
 By conceptualizing the relationship between UNESCO and the States Parties as that 426 
of franchisor and franchisee, it becomes easier to understand the existing macro-level 427 
management structures in place. More specifically, it provides an existing business 428 
framework by which to judge the levels of satisfaction of both parties involved in the WH 429 
management process. This can assist both the States Parties and the WH Committee should a 430 
dispute ever arise both in terms of understanding the source of the conflict as well as 431 
providing steps with which to solve it. Furthermore, this provides the groundwork for a new 432 
legal conceptualization of the WH convention, specifically in terms of the WH Committee’s 433 
ability to ensure that States Parties uphold their responsibilities in regards to their listed sites. 434 
Future research should apply this model to individual case studies in order to assess the 435 
appropriateness of fit. Additionally, subsequent studies could analyze the legal ramifications 436 
of applying international franchise legislation to the signatories of the WH Convention. 437 
Furthermore, this framework can be applied to analyses of individual WH management 438 
studies in order to fully understand the shared responsibilities between UNESCO and the 439 
States Parties responsible for the site(s).  440 
 441 
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